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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY SANTEE,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48153-2020

Kootenai County Case No.
CR28-19-16470

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Anthony Santee failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
sentencing him to five years, with two years determinate for delivery of a controlled substance,
and by denying his Rule 35 motion?
ARGUMENT
Santee Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
In August of 2017, authorities conducted two controlled purchases of heroin from Anthony

Santee. (PSI, p. 3.) The heroin tested by Idaho State Police weighed 0.36 grams. (PSI, p. 17.)
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The state charged Santee with one count of delivery of a controlled substance, and a persistent
violator enhancement. (R., pp. 24-25.) Santee pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance,
and the state agreed to dismiss the sentencing enhancement. (R., pp. 28, 30, 38.) The district court
sentenced Santee to five years, with two years determinate, and Santee filed a timely appeal. (R.,
pp. 40-41, 43-45.) Santee also filed a Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. (R., p. 51;
Aug. p. 1.)
On appeal, Santee argues that “his sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts, including those he presented with his Rule 35 motion, representing an abuse of the district
court’s sentencing discretion.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.) Santee has failed to show that the district
court abused its discretion by sentencing him to five years, with two years determinate for delivery
of a controlled substance, and by denying his Rule 35 motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. Where a

sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear
abuse of discretion.” State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time
of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution
applicable to a given case. Id. at 454, 447 P.3d at 902. “A sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605,
608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (citation omitted).
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“If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule
35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.” State
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In evaluating whether a lower court
abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

C.

Santee Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
The sentence imposed is within the statutory limits of I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). The record

shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal standards to the issue
before it, and acted reasonably and within the scope of its discretion.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered how to “best protect society,”
“deter [Santee] from future conduct like this and how to deter other people in similar situations,”
“address the punishment that society expects,” and “help any rehabilitation.” (05/29/2020 Tr., p.
33, L. 21 – p. 34, L. 1.) The district court stated that this case “is one of import before the Court
because of the prior criminal history.” (05/29/2020 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 5-6.) The district court noted
Santee’s prior convictions for delivery of methamphetamine where Santee was originally granted
probation, he violated that probation by “continuing to possess methamphetamine,” he “went down
on a rider program” after which he was again granted probation, and was on probation when he
committed the instant offense. (05/29/2020 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 7-12.) The district court stated that it
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looked “carefully at the crimes in the past” and at what Santee has “done in the last three years.”
(05/29/2020 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 17-20.)
The district court further reasoned that “the issue of selling drugs into a community or
giving them away is different in some respects than the issue of just using,” and the district court
“stringently rejects the notion that drug use is a victimless crime. Drug use is not, in this Court’s
opinion, a victimless crime.” (05/29/2020 Tr., p. 34, L. 23 - p. 35, L. 12.) The district court stated
that “when a person sells or gives those drugs into a community, it makes the activity much more
aggravated, because it is one thing for an individual to adversely affect their own life and adversely
affect the lives of those that are surrounding them.” (05/29/2020 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 6-11.) The district
court stated that “it’s another thing to simply distribute that into the community, because you have
no idea where it’s going,” and “certainly, they have their own free agency, too. They don’t need
to use what you’ve sold; they don’t need to buy what you’ve sold, but they do and you’ve provided
it; you being those who sell into a community.” (05/29/2020 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 12-21.)
The district court credited Santee for taking “the medical steps and the personal lifestyle
steps to change the impact on [his] life,” but what Santee can’t do “is change the harm that [he’s]
caused others.” (05/29/2020 Tr., p. 37, Ls. 1-5.) The district court stated that “[g]eneral deterrence
is about the overall view that community has to activity. When we deal with criminal activity in
a way that does not reflect that it’s seriously adverse to our society, it’s the same as saying, we’re
allowing that now,” and in the State of Idaho, “the selling of drugs into the community is not
viewed as we’re just accepting that now or we’ve grown to a spot where we don’t think that’s so
bad anymore.” (05/29/2020 Tr., p. 37, Ls. 16-25.)
At the Rule 35 hearing, the district court stated that it “reviewed [its] notes from the
sentencing in this matter and [it] remember[ed] that Mr. Santee had some degree of criminal history
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with drugs.” (01/08/2021 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1-4.) The district court noted that Santee “had a
paraphernalia conviction in 2012 when he was 21,” and “[a]t

he was convicted of delivery

of a controlled substance, two different counts.” (01/08/2021 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 4-8.) The district
court noted that “the sentence in that matter was a six-year sentence; three fixed and three
indeterminate, and placed on probation,” and Santee “went on a rider after that probation, but then
eventually came back and completed probation.” (01/08/2021 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 9-14.) The district
court noted that he “was convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance in 2014 and
given probation. It was a seven-year sentence; three fixed and four indeterminate. He was
convicted of obstructing a law enforcement officer in 2017.” (01/08/2021 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 15-19.)
The district court stated “then in that same year of 2017 where these acts of a controlled buy of
heroin from Mr. Santee who told the presentence investigator that he had been selling drugs in
Idaho in order to facilitate his move to the State of Oregon.” (01/08/2021 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 20-24.)
The district court stated that the “move to Oregon may have been a good thing for him in terms of
creating [a] stable living environment, but he got there by committing a really serious offense.”
(01/08/2021 Tr., p. 15, L. 24 – p. 16, L. 2.) The district court stated “[w]ith that in mind, the Court
just cannot find that a sentence in this case under those circumstances of five years; two fixed and
three indeterminate, is in any way an excessive sentence.” (01/08/2021 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 3-6.) The
district court determined that everything it heard at the Rule 35 hearing “is appropriate for the
parole board to hear and determine when Mr. Santee comes before the parole board. But in [the
district court’s] discretion, it is not sufficient to reduce or modify this sentence.” (01/08/2021 Tr.,
p. 16, Ls. 17-21.)
Santee argues that the mitigating factors—age, substance abuse issues, completion of a
previous rider, employment, education and housing—show an abuse of discretion. (Appellant’s
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brief, pp. 4-6.) Santee’s argument does not show an abuse of discretion. As the district court
detailed at sentencing and the Rule 35 hearing, Santee had been convicted of two counts of delivery
of a controlled substance in 2013. (PSI, pp. 4-5.) Santee received two years on probation for those
convictions, and was then convicted of possession of a controlled substance in 2014. (PSI, p. 5.)
The district court placed Santee on probation for another two years, and in 2017, Santee sold
heroin. (PSI, p. 5.) Santee received substance abuse treatment in Cottonwood while serving a
rider and the Port of Hope in 2013. (PSI, p. 11.)
Santee’s prior convictions and opportunities on probation and retained jurisdiction show
that alternative treatment has not deterred his criminal behavior. The heroin that Santee sold
presents a harm to the community, and the offense merits the term of imprisonment imposed. The
sentence imposed provides proper punishment for delivering heroin, and a lesser sentence would
depreciate the seriousness of the instant offense. The mitigating factors do not justify a reduction
of the sentence in this case. Santee has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion
by sentencing him to five years, with two years determinate, and by denying his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2021.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

ZACHARI S. HALLETT
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of August, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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